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The Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak: A Critical Review 
 
 
Nimer Sultany * 
 
 
“Here in the penal colony I have been appointed as judge”1 
 
I. 
 
 Former Chief Justice Aharon Barak is definitely the most outstanding judge in 
Israel’s history. No other judge has left as many significant fingerprints on Israel’s 
Supreme Court (ISC). No judge has influenced Israeli law and society as well as its 
image abroad as much as he did. Barak’s meticulous rulings and academic scholarship 
cover an impressive range of fields of law and knowledge and have promoted rights-
minded discourse inside Israel. Given this background, however, Barak’s record on 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is overwhelmingly disappointing. 
 Legal interpretation, Robert Cover argues, cannot be understood separately from 
the violence of the judge: “A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a 
result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”2 
Following Cover, this short article attempts to expose this violence and to bring its 
victims to the center of the discussion of Barak’s jurisprudential legacy—those very 
victims that the “activist-judge” is supposed to be crusading to defend. Indeed, any 
assessment or evaluation of Barak’s legacy will be incomplete and inaccurate without 
assessing the impact of Barak’s legacy on the Palestinians in the OPT.3 I would like to 
contextualize Barak’s legacy as internal to a framework of domination and 
subordination within which he, as a former judge in the Israeli judicial system, 
operated. Barak as a leading judge and as a Chief Justice did not only work within this 
                                                 
1 FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in THE METAMORPHOSIS AND OTHER STORIES 116 
(Malcolm Pasley trans., 1992).  
2 See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
3 Due to lack of space, this article will not deal with Barak’s attitudes toward the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel. An examination of these attitudes would reveal that Barak’s 
ethnocentric framing of the issues and submitting equality to Jewishness as the Grundnorm 
largely go unnoticed and unscrutinized.    
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framework but also has justified it, refined it, and explained and represented it as a 
“diplomat-judge.”  
 My emphasis will be less on what Barak has said and written, but rather on what 
he has done, the impact of his opinions on the victims he has left behind, and the 
alternative narratives he has so powerfully destroyed. The primary source of the 
distortion in discussing Barak’s legacy rests on the emphasis on his “liberal” rhetoric 
while at the same time ignoring the illiberal outcomes of his Supreme Court opinions. 
As will become apparent in the course of this article, Barak’s legacy is not liberal in 
any convincing way. The article will also highlight the totally ignored aspect of Barak’s 
work as a “diplomat-judge”: a judge who is the main representative of his state’s 
policies abroad.           
 
II. 
 
 Under the all-seeing eye of the judicial review exercised by the ISC and promoted 
and led by Barak, a sophisticated system of oppression has developed in the OPT. 
Confiscation of land and colonization (allowing the population of the occupier to 
settle in the occupied territory);4 two different systems of law applying to two 
populations within the same territory (the Palestinians on the one hand and the 
privileged Israeli settlers on the other hand);5 a military court system virtually immune 
from the ISC’s intervention;6 a widespread and long-standing policy of house 
demolition;7 extrajudicial executions;8 a hostile family unification policy;9 arbitrary 
manned and unmanned checkpoints and roadblocks preventing ordinary life;10 the 
separation wall;11 detention – including administrative detention – of large numbers of 
                                                 
4 See e.g., RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK (1988).  
5 See e.g., B’Tselem, Free Rein: Vigilante Settlers and Israel’s Non-Enforcement of the Law (2001), 
available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200110_Free_Rein_Eng.pdf; B’Tselem, 
Forbidden Roads: The Discriminatory West Bank Road Regime (2004), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200408_Forbidden_Roads_Eng.pdf.  
6 See e.g., LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN 
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (2005). 
7 See e.g., Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Under the Rubble: House 
Demolition and Destruction of Land and Property (2004), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE150332004. 
8 See e.g., Public Committee Against Torture in Israel & LAW – The Palestinian Society 
for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, Mdeneyot ha-Hesulim shel Mdenat 
Yisrael, November 2000 – Yanuar 2002 [The Assassinations Policy of the State of Israel, November 2000 
– January 2002] (2002), available at 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il//heb/images/uploaded/publications/46.doc.   
9 See e.g., B’Tselem and Hamoked, Families Torn Apart (1999), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199907_Families_torn_apart_Heb.pdf. 
10 See e.g., It’s the Little Things That Make an Occupation, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2007, at 
64. 
11 See e.g., B’Tselem, Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel’s Separation 
Barrier, Position Paper (2003), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200304_Behind_The_Barrier_Eng.pdf.  
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Palestinians and inhumane conditions of incarceration and torture;12 expulsion and 
deportation;13 curfews and closures;14 and killings with impunity15 are the highlights of 
this system that Barak justified and, hence, advanced.16 
 Justice Barak has employed a manifold of interconnected legal and rhetorical 
strategies within his judicial review to allow the evolution of this oppressive system. 
As I explain and demonstrate below, these strategies include oppression-blind 
jurisprudence, concealment of the general context, fragmentation of reality, the 
practice of non-intervention and submission to dubious “security” considerations 
disguised rhetorically by “balancing” and “proportionality” tests, and declining to 
provide meaningful and timely legal remedies.  
 The legal reasoning of Justice Barak and his Court, according to David Kretzmer, 
exemplifies the attitude of a “benevolent occupation,” within which the “belligerent 
occupier” transforms rhetorically his interests into the interests of the local 
population (or the “protected persons”) while ignoring the broader political context.17  
 Kretzmer also points out that Barak’s rhetoric on widening the scope of judicial 
review did not bring with it any significant change in the ISC’s willingness to interfere 
in security-based decisions. Indeed, even in the torture case of 199918 – widely 
perceived as a departure from the Court’s policy of non-intervention and considered 
by many as the main case where Barak challenged the security establishment – Barak 
expressed his identification with the security considerations. This identification 
explains why the Court delayed its decision for years, though knowing that torture 
had become a widespread practice not limited to “ticking bomb” situations, and 
refused to grant (or revoked) interim injunctions preventing torture in spite of the 
clarity of the legal position.19 The limited nature of the decision, which legitimated 
some interrogation practices through the “necessity” defense, and the reluctance of 
                                                 
12 See e.g., FIDH, Palestinian Detainees in Israel: Inhuman Conditions of Detention (2003), available 
at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ps365a.pdf.  
13 See e.g., B’Tselem, Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass 
Deportation of December 1992 (1993), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199306_Deportation_Eng.doc.  
14 See e.g., B’Tselem, Collective Punishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1990), available 
at http://www.btselem.org/Download/199011_Collective_Punishment_Eng.pdf.  
15 See B’Tselem, Trigger Happy: Unjustified Shooting and Violation of the Open-Fire Regulations 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada (2002), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200203_Trigger_Happy_Eng.pdf.  
16 See generally Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, John Dugard, U.N. Doc A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 
29, 2007), available http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=91.    
17 DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 68-71 (2002).  
18 HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 
[1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817.  
19 KRETZMER, supra note 17, at 141-42.  
86 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 48 
 
the Court can also explain, even if only partially, the fact that evidence of torture still 
exists in the wake of this ruling.20  
 Ardi Imseis exposes the limited scope of Barak’s decision: the Court did not 
examine all the interrogation methods of the General Security Service (GSS) and did 
not obligate the state to disclose all these methods for the purpose of judicial 
examination.21 It ruled only regarding five physical interrogation methods.22 It also did 
not examine interrogation methods by state organs other than the GSS, such as the 
Israeli army itself, and it did not examine the treatment of Palestinian detainees in the 
period between detention and interrogation.23 Furthermore, Imseis points out two 
additional shortcomings of Barak’s decision. First, Imseis notes the Court’s “overly 
simplistic contextualization of the case before it as merely requiring a balance between 
respecting the liberty rights of ‘hostile terrorists’ and protecting the ‘security’ of the 
state.”24 Second, the Court outlawed the specific interrogation methods under review 
because they were not authorized by Israeli law, not because they amount to torture 
or because they violate international law.25 Additionally, Barak ignored the question of 
the effect—or more accurately, the lack thereof—of this ruling on all the past rulings 
in which the Court legitimated torture. Specifically, he completely ignored the claims 
of Palestinian torture victims, who had been doubly victimized, first by GSS torture, 
then by the Court’s string of legitimating decisions up to 1999.26 Indeed, the ISC’s 
inadequate response to torture “calls into question the very notion of the ‘rule of law’ 
in a democratic society.”27           
 One of the most devastating examples of this oppression-blind approach of non-
intervention due to security considerations was, without a doubt, the Court’s 
unwillingness to reject the policy of punitive home demolitions, wherein the houses 
of families of suspected security offenders were demolished. Under both Meir 
Shamgar’s and Barak’s presidencies, the Court granted the security establishment 
virtual carte blanche to destroy Palestinian houses and refused to characterize it as a 
                                                 
20 See e.g., Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Back to a Routine of Torture: Torture 
and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees during Arrest Detention and Interrogation, September 2001 – 
April 2003 (2003), available at 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il//eng/images/uploaded/publications/58.pdf. 
21 Ardi Imseis, “Moderate” Torture On Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli Supreme Court 
Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service Interrogation Methods, 19 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L.  328, 341-43 (2001). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 349. 
25 Id. at 346.  
26 Cf. Gideon Levy, Good Morning, High Court, HAARETZ, April 16, 2000 (“Who will pay 
reparations to the tens of thousands of people who were tortured with your authorization 
before torture became illegal and thus immoral?”) 
27 Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System’s Failure to Prevent 
Torture in the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 76 (2002). 
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form of collective punishment prohibited by international law.28 Legal interpretation 
could have been a handy device to limit and restrict these demolitions if there had 
been a willing judge. But both Shamgar and Barak were unwilling. The main argument 
that the Court used – adopting the security establishment’s reasoning – was 
“deterrence.”29 In 2003 and 2005, however, two internal military committees formed 
by the Israeli army concluded that “no effective deterrence was proven,” and that 
“deterrence, limited if at all, paled in comparison to the hatred and hostility toward 
Israel that the demolitions provoked among the Palestinians.”30 The committees 
recommended ending this policy. Moreover, even if we assume that this draconian 
policy was effective, that does not mean that the policy of home demolitions is 
permissible under international law.31 
 The fact that Justice Mishael Cheshin, a generally conservative judge, has 
represented a dissenting view within the Court by opposing punitive home 
demolitions in some cases indicates that Barak could have taken another path, a more 
rights-minded one. Barak, however, chose to affirm state power. This position is also 
clear upon examining Barak’s rulings concerning the massive home demolitions 
during military operations in the second intifada.       
 The ruling on the expulsion of 415 Palestinians from the OPT into Lebanon in 
December 1992 by the Yitzhak Rabin government remains the most striking example 
of the ISC’s capitulation to state security officials with no regard for due process and 
human rights.32 The Court issued a unanimous decision legitimating the mass 
expulsion of these Palestinians, who had not had a legal hearing prior to their 
expulsion. The Court ruled, ex post facto, that the deportees had had a formal right to a 
hearing, and it did not prevent, or even criticize, the deportations. After initially 
having issued an interim injunction to stop the deportation process and having 
adopted the position that the deportations were illegal in the Court’s internal 
deliberations, Barak capitulated to Chief Justice Shamgar’s pressure.33 According to 
Nomi Levitsky, Barak later regretted his ultimate position.34 Unfortunately his sense 
of regret did not evolve into a jurisprudence of regret. In fact, Barak continued this 
                                                 
28 See Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 4 (1994). Simon mentions that in the period 1979 to 1994 the Supreme Court issued 94 
rulings dealing with house demolitions: “The Court’s record displays almost uniform support 
of the practice …. The Supreme Court’s approach of demolitions in the face of legal and 
moral challenges has corrupted Israeli law and has undermined the legitimacy of the Court 
itself.” Id. See also KRETZMER, supra note 17, at 162. 
29 KRETZMER, supra note 17, at 161-62. 
30 Amos Harel, IDF Panel Recommends Ending Policy of House Demolitions, HAARETZ, Feb. 17, 
2005. 
31 See Martin Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the Occupied Territories: An 
Analysis of its Legacy in International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195 (1990). 
32 HCJ 5973/92 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense [1993] 
IsrSC 47(1) 267. 
33 NOMI LEVITSKY, KEVODO: AHARON BARAK: BIYOGRAFYAH [YOUR HONOR: AHARON 
BARAK: A BIOGRAPHY] 183-87 (2001). 
34 Id. at 188. 
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tradition of submitting to “security” considerations. For instance, in the Ajori case in 
2002, Barak allowed the deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza 
Strip.35  
 We can find further evidence of that same approach in Barak’s later rulings where 
we again see the Court’s reluctance to deliver a remedy to the petitioners in real time. 
The main petition against the extrajudicial executions (“targeted assassinations” in the 
Israeli jargon), to take one example, was delayed for years while the policy continued 
on the ground. At the end of the day, Barak decided that these extrajudicial 
executions are not always permissible and not always prohibited.36 The army 
understood the ruling as validating its current policies.37 Barak, of course, could have 
chosen another path. In an expert opinion submitted to the Court, international law 
scholar Antonio Cassese argued that “killing civilians suspected of terrorism, while 
they are not engaged in military action,” is a war crime.38           
 While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in an advisory opinion that 
the separation wall Israel is building is illegal as a whole insofar as it is built inside the 
OPT, and that it should be dismantled,39 Barak decided to take a different approach. 
Declaring his “factual superiority” over the ICJ, Barak refused to rule on the general 
legality of the separation wall. Instead, he decided that there should be an examination 
of specific portions of the wall while “balancing” between security needs and 
Palestinian rights and examining the “proportionality” of the means.40 While the ISC 
rejected some of the first portions of the separation wall presented to it, the Court 
eventually approved most of the other portions in a series of later petitions.41 The 
same legal strategy has been used in answering the question of the legality of the 
Israeli settlements inside the OPT.42 In both situations, the ISC legitimated the overall 
                                                 
35 HCJ 7015/02 Kifah Ajori v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 
352, available at http://www.court.gov.il/heb/home.htm.  
36 HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et. al. v. The Government 
of Israel et. al. [2006] [hereinafter Extrajudicial Executions Policy Case], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM. 
37 Scott Wilson, Israeli High Court Backs Military On Its Policy of ‘Targeted Killings’, THE WASH. 
POST, Dec. 15, 2006; Hanan Greenberg, Military Advocacy Relieved over Targeted Killing Ruling, 
YNET, Dec. 14, 2006. 
38 Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether Israel’s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists is 
Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, 20, available at 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il//eng/images/uploaded/publications/64.pdf.  
39 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].    
40 HCJ 2056/04 Local Municipality Beit Sureik and others v. The Government of Israel 
[2004] IsrSc 58(5) 807; and HCJ 7957/04 Zahran Mara’abeh et. al. v. Prime Minister of Israel 
et. al. [2005], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf.   
41 See e.g., HCJ 4289/05 Local Municipality Beer Nabalah and 149 others v. Government 
of Israel [2006], available at http://www.court.gov.il/heb/home.htm; HCJ 11395/05 Maamon 
Kayed, Head of the Local Municipality Sabastia et. al. v. State of Israel [2006], available at 
http://www.court.gov.il/heb/home.htm. 
42 HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. The Government of Israel [1979] IsrSc 34(1) 1. 
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project.43 Unlike the ICJ, the ISC refrains from addressing what it considers to be 
“general” questions. Thus, neither the “general” framework of oppression nor the 
“general” means of oppression can be successfully challenged in the Court.  
 The Court fragments reality into small pieces and conceals the generality of 
oppression while stripping it from its background and context.44 Despite four decades 
of continued occupation, Barak has never addressed the occupation directly; had he 
done so he might have reached the conclusion that the very system of the Israeli 
occupation is itself “intrinsically illegal” and amounts to a de facto annexation,45 or 
that the colonies in the OPT (including the annexation of East Jerusalem) are an 
illegal project.46                        
 
III. 
 
 One can dismiss this argument by saying that a judge, even an “activist-judge” like 
Barak, did not create the occupation and will not be able to resolve it. However, this 
argument conceals the complicity of judges in creating and shaping this system of 
oppression. After all, Barak himself argues, “I regard the judge as a partner in creating 
law. As a partner, the judge must maintain the coherence of the legal system as a 
whole.”47 It also ignores all the lost opportunities in which Barak could have used his 
legal tools to block some of the oppressive practices that have developed under his 
power of judicial review, but he chose instead to employ an oppression-blind 
jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be clear by now that Barak cannot be characterized 
as an “activist judge” at least when it comes to his rulings vis-à-vis the Palestinians. 
 Leon Sheleff has argued that the ISC is activist inside Israel proper but not in the 
OPT.48 This paradigmatic distinction in the Court’s approach rests on a false 
assumption that Israel can sustain a democratic regime inside its borders unaffected 
by its oppressive practices in the OPT. In reality, however, the internal processes of 
Israeli society went hand-in-hand with the continuous evolution of the occupation 
regime and its internal logic. Indeed, as Baruch Kimmerling has argued, Israel and the 
                                                 
43 See Ronen Shamir, Landmark Cases and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s 
High Court of Justice, 24(3) LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 788-89 (1990) (discussing the ISC’s rulings 
on the settlements); Michael Lynk, Down By Law: The High Court of Israel, International Law, and 
the Separation Wall, 35(1) J. PALESTINE STUD. 6 (2005) (discussing the ISC’s rulings on the 
separation wall).    
44 See Nimer Sultany, The Perfect Crime: the Supreme Court, the Occupied Territories, and al-Aqsa 
Intifada, 3 ADALAH’S REV. 49, 53-4 (2002).   
45 Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551 (2005). 
46 Advisory Opinion, supra note 39, ¶120. 
47 Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 19, 25 (2003). 
48 Leon Sheleff, Gvol ha-Activism Who ha-Kav ha-Yaruk: Bishuli o-Bishveli ha-Psikah shel Beit ha-
Mishpat ha-Gavoah la-Tsedek ba Shtahim [The Green Line is the Border of Judicial Activism: Queries 
about High Court of Justice Judgments in the Territories], 17 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 757 (1993). 
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OPT should be seen as one control system.49 Accordingly, Hassan Jabareen argues 
that “Barak cannot draw a line between himself and the Palestinians.”50 In other 
words, Barak cannot separate himself from his Other. He cannot seriously claim that 
he is a democratic judge without regard of his legacy in the OPT.   
 Needless to say, security in the final analysis is not a neutral notion; rather it is 
part and parcel of the ideology of the state as a Jewish and Zionist state. Thus, 
submission to security-based arguments is another demonstration of submission to 
state ideology. 
    The complicity of Israeli judges in the occupation is also apparent in the symbolic 
power they exercise and the symbolic capital they possess. These are used and 
invested by the judges and by the state to legitimate existing power relations and 
conceal their oppressive nature. In this case, the “activist-judge” becomes an activist 
of the oppressive system. He is an essential part of it. His symbolic power and his 
symbolic capital are constituted by power relations. The judge, in his turn, constitutes 
these relations by reproducing them as legitimate. Undoubtedly, Barak and Israel were 
aware of his symbolic power. In this sense, Barak served as a “diplomat-judge.” Israel 
has used Barak’s rhetoric before U.N. human rights bodies and turned him into 
“Israel’s public defender abroad.”51 In July 2004 following the ISC’s decision on the 
separation wall and before the ICJ’s ruling, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared that, 
“the stature of the Israeli Supreme Court and of its president Justice Aharon Barak in 
the world [makes] their rulings helpful to us at The Hague. They provide a legal 
rejoinder.”52 In a separate instance, Barak similarly defied international norms and 
admitted that the ISC’s judicial review helps Israeli soldiers by making it harder for 
the International Criminal Court to try them.53 Another illustration of Barak’s 
awareness of his role as a “diplomat-judge” is the fact that his ruling on the separation 
wall was delivered several days before the ICJ’s ruling and immediately translated into 
English.    
 One wonders, upon examining Barak’s statements and judicial legacy, if his 
change-of-office from the legal advisor of the government – Attorney General – to 
Supreme Court justice was at all accompanied by a change-of-paradigm in his 
perception of his role. 
  
                                                 
49 See Baruch Kimmerling, Boundaries and Frontiers of the Israeli Control System: Analytical 
Conclusions, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SOCIETY: BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS (Baruch 
Kimmerling ed., 1989). 
50 Hassan Jabareen, Ignoring the ‘Other’, HAARETZ (Books Supp.), June 17, 2005. 
51 Id. See also Yehuda Ben Meir, Ha-Shakhpats shel ha-Mdinah [The Bulletproof of the State], 
HAARETZ, Dec. 20, 200.  
52 Diana Bechur-Nir, Sharon: Psikat Bagats Ta’zor Bihag [Sharon: High Court’s Ruling Will Help 
at The Hague], YNET, July 4, 2004.   
53 Noted in Moshe Gorali, Ha-Mishpat Hacham ‘al Halashim. Shalosh Dogma’ot [The Law is 
Smart on The Weak. Three Examples], HAARETZ, June 1, 2003.       
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IV. 
 
 Interestingly, Barak has justified the fact that he had never visited the OPT to see 
the living conditions of the Palestinians by claiming that he retains his “objectivity” 
this way.54 On the other hand, he has on many occasions stressed in his rulings and 
writings the fact that he – along with his fellow judges – does not live in an ivory 
tower but rather amongst his own people. Barak, so it seems, does not take into 
account the effect of his own situational biases on his “objectivity” and on his judicial 
role. He rationalizes his willful blindness concerning the conditions of his own victims 
into a removal of obstacles facing his refined reasoning. Elsewhere Barak has argued, 
“[I]t is a myth that judges always give expression to their subjective beliefs. According 
to my view – both normatively and descriptively – a judge gives expression not to his 
or her own beliefs but to the deep, underlying beliefs of society. The key concept is 
judicial objectivity.”55 Regardless of the problematic legal and theoretical nature of 
this argument, Barak – a self-declared Zionist – does not contemplate the otherness 
of Palestinians in the eyes of the Israeli society, including the judges.56 In the “deep, 
underlying beliefs” of the Zionist project, the Palestinian stands as the Other. 
 Barak has emphasized in his rulings the security situation that Israel faces and his 
identification with its security concerns. Palestinian organizations sew destruction and 
terror, according to his description. Thus, Israel has the right and obligation to defend 
its citizens. It is a “defensive democracy” reacting to attacks. This reasoning holds not 
only for Israel but for other democratic countries that now face the same situation.57 
Barak sees no difference between the prolonged Israeli occupation and the situation 
of Western democracies. Israel in his story is a passive victim without a political 
agency. The intifada is too easily and uncritically characterized by Barak as a form of 
“terrorism.” No attention is paid to the period that preceded the outbreak of the 
intifada; and no attempt is made to understand the causes that led to its outbreak. In 
short, it is terrorism without context, violence without reason. The “balancing” that 
the judge invokes is between (Israeli) “security needs” and (Palestinian) “individual 
rights.”58 The context of occupation and the right of self-determination is not allowed 
to enter the juridical picture. In fact, Barak and his Court have never used the word 
“occupation” (kibbush in Hebrew) in their rulings. The Court translates the English 
phrase “belligerent occupation” into the Hebrew tfisah lohmatit (“belligerent 
possession”) leaving the word occupation out. Likewise, the phrase “occupied 
territories” is never used by the Court, but rather ha-Ezur (“the Area”). For the Court, 
the occupation does not exist.        
                                                 
54 Barak’s statement to this effect is reported in a conversation with former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter. See LEVITSKY, supra note 33, at 290. See also JIMMY CARTER, PALESTINE: PEACE 
NOT APARTHEID 126 (2006).       
55 Barak, supra note 47, at 51.  
56 One of Barak’s former clerks stated that “deep inside” Barak perceives the Palestinians 
as “bitter and dangerous enemies.” Quoted in LEVITSKY, supra note 33, at 290-91.   
57 See Barak, supra note 47, at 148.  
58 See Extrajudicial Executions Policy Case, supra note 36, ¶63.  
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 What Barak’s description ignores and conceals is the destructive effect of the 
subjugation of life by the power of death in late colonial regimes.59 Achille Mbembe 
argues that the “most accomplished form of necropower [power of death] is the 
contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine” since it combines “the disciplinary, 
the biopolitical, and the necropolitical.”60 “To live under late modern occupation,” 
writes Mbembe, “is to experience a permanent condition of ‘being in pain.’”61        
 Instead of weakening this grip of the occupation’s power-of-death on the daily 
life of the Palestinians by defending human rights, Barak and the ISC allowed the 
development of the occupation machine. The Court’s narration of violence has 
deliberately erased all traces of the production of death and destruction by the 
occupation. Moreover, the Court has provided the legal reasoning required for its 
justification. This justification coupled with the illusion of the Palestinian voice being 
heard in the Court and the availability of an option for “legal remedy” resulted in 
legitimating the occupation. The Israeli historian Tom Segev writes: 
 
 An eminent, liberal, sympathetic and paternal jurist who did not hold himself 
above the people, Barak also gave the horrors of the oppression a legitimate 
front; decent people can tell themselves that if Barak could live with the 
occupation, then so can they. His guilt is therefore greater than that of the people 
doing the dirty work out in the field.62                                                        
 
V. 
 
 “A judge,” Barak writes, “should not advance the intent of an undemocratic 
legislator. He must avoid giving expression to undemocratic fundamental values.”63 It 
cannot be said however that Barak practiced what he preached. At the same time 
human rights violations in the OPT were reaching new heights in the second intifada, 
and human rights organizations and activists became highly critical of Israel, Barak 
and his fellow justices continued their work as usual. “Balancing” tests employed as 
usual. “Proportionality” tests employed as usual. “Security” employed, unhindered, as 
usual. Oppression justified as usual. 
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